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Abstract
Although legal personality has slowly begun to be granted to non-human entities that have a direct impact on the natural 
functioning of human societies (given their cultural significance), the same cannot be said for computer-based intelligence 
systems. While this notion has not had a significantly negative impact on humanity to this point in time that only remains the 
case because advanced computerised intelligence systems (ACIS) have not been acknowledged as reaching human-like levels. 
With the integration of ACIS in medical assistive technologies such as companion robots and bionics, our legal treatment 
of ACIS must also adapt—least society faces legal challenges that may potentially lead to legally sanctioned discrimina-
tory treatment. For this reason, this article exposes the complexity of normalizing definitions of “natural” human subjects, 
clarifies how current bioethical discourse has been unable to effectively guide ACIS integration into implanted and external 
artefacts, and argues for the establishment of legal delineations between various ACIS-human mergers in reference to legal 
protections and obligations internationally.
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1 Introduction
The notions of human-centred legal personality [16] are less 
contended today than notions of ethnic or national identity 
and are generally not as contended on an international scale 
depending on the part of the globe one makes their observa-
tion. After all: if someone looks human, society has had no 
reason to believe that they are not human to this point in his-
tory. Notions of pseudohumanity ([37], pp. 242–244) or con-
cepts that degrade other humans as a “lesser” entity aside, 
our species has been content to maintain this naïve ignorance 
even as our technological advancements have surpassed our 
wildest expectations over the past century. Examples of this 
can be found in current science-fiction media, such as the 
film Ex Machina [15], which depicts the risks of developing 
artificial intelligence in an “embodied” state and alludes to 
one predicted future wherein humanity must worry for its 
dominance [4, 7, 41]. A more tangible example would be the 
current advances being made in assistive bionic prosthetics 
(ABPs) that utilise increasingly advanced computer intel-
ligence systems [1, 44].
Other arguments to this point can be made that without 
qualifiers and constant displays relating back to its “com-
puter-ness,” Sophia the Robot may—at casual observa-
tion—be considered a sentient being insofar as the system 
is able to emulate a “human-like” personality.1 It remains 
to be argued, however, whether this personality emulation 
is sufficient enough to qualify an advanced computer intel-
ligence system (ACIS) legal protections; to which this author 
would argue that the indistinguishability between ACIS 
and humans ought to qualify ACIS legal personality given 
how tests for biological humanness may be constituted as 
immoral or rights-infringing in concept. Or in other terms, 
that the lack of organic chemical matter within ACIS places 
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1 Notwithstanding arguments that advanced computer intelligence 
system (ACIS) are being overtly anthropomorphised by humanity, 
and that too much “human” attribution to these systems may pose 
other issues. While it may be rational that our species attribute traits 
to inanimate objects to make them more relatable, we cannot forget 
that there is a fine line between empathetic and sympathetic “related-
ness” and that sympathy is an imagined version of empathy (or rather, 
an imagined relation to a sentiment one shares with another individ-
ual that one has also gone through). This general concept digresses 
from the main substance of this article and shall be left aside for a 
different forum given the metaphysical nature of the subject.
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it in a separate category from non-human animals that might 
be used as comparisons for behaviour—such as in the case of 
chimpanzees that can “communicate” with researchers via 
sign language. In this sense, ACIS finds more in common 
with other artificial legal personalities within jurisprudence 
internationally than with biological ones [21] and ought to 
be approached uniquely to protect its interests as an entity, if 
not the interests of those who will be impacted by its poten-
tial displays of “will”.
A concern emerges from this in a bioethical vein of think-
ing, however; namely, in how long this naïveté can last in the 
face of humanity’s quest to supersede its biological limita-
tions. After all, we continue to claim a desire to develop an 
artificial general intelligence system without quantifying the 
extent to which intelligence is to be measured when com-
pared to humanity [23, 27, 31]. Such motions are dangerous 
in the potentiality for aspects of “human” intelligence to be 
considered insufficient, even though they may be protected 
via other means in various areas of jurisprudence [16, 23], 
thereby developing a sense that these unincorporated aspects 
of “human” intelligence are insufficient to serve as repre-
sentative of humanity in a more general sense [37].
Arguably, this concern is not new, even within the broader 
field of philosophic thought. Much ink has been set on the 
subjects of human augmentation (HA), gene therapy (GT) 
or manipulation (GeMa),2 eugenics,3 and other like medi-
cal practices, after all [6, 12, 36, 38]. What remains to 
be changed, however, are the foundations underlying the 
ethical and legal concerns presented within this myriad of 
academic and scientific literature. Whether these underly-
ing concerns are simply of no significance to the typical 
individual in light of their new-found ability to extend their 
natural lifespan or the consequence of a society where state 
authorities rarely challenge individual freedoms, the reality 
remains that a more extensive discussion on the implica-
tions of HA remains relatively stagnant at the judicial and 
legislative levels [22, 23].4 It could be said that this stagna-
tion is not an inherently “bad” state of being for the topic 
given the relative political “charge” it holds over members 
of society—though this is again an inherently naïve posi-
tion to maintain given how fast technology is evolving. Our 
historical treatment of the nominal “other” in law, specifi-
cally the treatment of some purported “other” human(s) that 
exist “outside” our individual societies regardless of their 
presence and social importance within them [16, 17], is what 
drives the urgency of this writing.
Although society may not run across legal challenges 
concerning the determination of a given individual’s right 
to claim legal personality under de lege lata5 for another 
decade or so when technologically enhanced [23],6 it ought 
not to be ignored that these questions are inevitably coming 
to the fore regardless their relevance in current discourses. 
Given the recent international cries for “racial” justice in 
this global pandemic7 in the USA and abroad, this topic has 
become more critical than ever to address.
Rather than focus specifically on “race,” this essay aims 
to clarify the ambiguity that resides in the realm of medi-
cally or scientifically altered persons given its general lack 
of attention in mainstream bioethical discourse ( [5, 14, 40].8 
These alterations include, but may not be limited to: bionic 
enhancement or structural9 support, cybernetic enhancement 
or structural support (including virtual avatars), GeMa in 
germline or somatic human cells and related cell organelles, 
normal technological ability enhancement,10 and psycho- or 
neuro-pharmacologic enhancement (including nootropics)—
even if each technique is not individually addressed herein.
The rationale for bringing a bioethical discourse before a 
more technology-focussed audience lies in the lack of com-
prehension scholars hold in both fields regarding the others 
2 Defined as such to divert from the bias that some academics and 
lay-people hold towards the notions of genetically-modified (GM) 
products in general, which are arguably more produce- or animal-ori-
ented than human-oriented in connotation.
3 Insofar as it is unrelated to GeMa practices.
4 Forthcoming work by author under typesetting.
5 The law as it exists, without consideration for how it should be.
6 To differentiate between pharmaceutically-enhanced individuals or 
those utilizing nootropics, as these may technically qualify as being 
technological enhancements under particular interpretations to the 
semantic meanings of the phrase.
7 Sparked by the merciless killing of George Floyd and others at the 
hands of local police officials in the USA during the global health cri-
sis.
8 Beauchamp and Childress seem only to address ethical concerns of 
biotechnology insofar as it relates to traditionally recognised concerns 
in the field—namely, in its use for creating animal-human hybrids to 
grow organs or other significant hormones/compounds for patients. 
Their lack of focus on issues of artificial intelligence’s integration 
into medical technologies in their newest edition of Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics is highly concerning in this regard, as it displays a 
lack of attention to current issues being faced by bioethicists, patients, 
and physicians alike. Out of the three cited, only Furrow et.al. [14] 
addresses the subject of biobanks (pp. 557–563)—which is frighten-
ing considering new developments in the field towards biobank regu-
lation in 2016 and beyond, such as the World Medical Association’s 
Declaration of Taipei (https:// www. wma. net/ polic ies- post/ wma- decla 
ration- of- taipei- on- ethic al- consi derat ions- regar ding- health- datab ases- 
and- bioba nks/, [2020, last accessed 5 February 2021]).
9 Referring to the structure of the human body, as in cases of ampu-
tees or more generally to address deformities of the natural biologic 
components of the human form.
10 When regarding access to the Internet of Things through elec-
tronic computer systems in a more specific sense. The development 
of books and reading do not fit into this category given the notion of 
“preadaptation” to these advances [42].
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normative understanding of “basic” arguments in their 
respective field. Given that these “mis”-communications of 
thought inevitably exist given various requirements for indi-
vidual specialisation, it is hoped that this article can bridge 
some gaps that exist between bioethicists and the techno-
logical community that encompasses their regular activities. 
This framing entails that much of the argumentation herein 
will be formatted in a manner that will allow scholars from 
various fields to understand the novelty of the author’s opin-
ion—being a scholar that is posed in a niche area of thought 
between non-medical bioethics and non-practical technoethi-
cal musings. As such, the treatment of ACIS will be sparse 
until the end of this dialogue given that ACIS will inevita-
bly frame all other technological artefacts and techniques 
discussed herein. Without understanding the complications 
that abound in HA, GeMa, and GT from a more neutral and 
polythematic perspective often neglected in bioethical dis-
course11 and elsewhere, it is unlikely that the severity of 
how these techniques will fundamentally impact societal 
structures will be taken or appreciated by scholars of all 
forms—nor will humanity be able to adjust the course being 
taken by these rapid advances in technological complexity 
before irreparable damage is wrought to the foundations we 
currently, and often, take for granted.
2  Defining the “natural” human in the face 
of rapid technological advancements
The very concept of distinguishing between what “naturally” 
constitutes as a human given the various tools our species 
implements to enhance daily life may seem like a failed 
intellectual pursuit, at least when considered at face-value 
alone [42]. Of course, anthropologic studies have already 
given this topic significant attention and would seem the 
de facto source for a scholastic understanding of “natural” 
humans. It remains to be argued, however, that the definition 
of a “natural” human is more clear-cut than what is left to be 
assumed at the crux of this scholastic exploration. After all, 
the concept that is “normality” (or rather, “natural” behav-
iours and societal expectations) depends heavily upon the 
relative point in history one looks to compare “naturalness” 
from “unnaturalness” in the species ([25], pp. 56, 58–59). 
Taken from this perspective, it should become clear that 
some “unnatural” practice that arose from the implementa-
tion of a new technique or tool gradually became an accepted 
norm for humanity, given its importance in elevating our 
daily lives—thus granting society a new perception on what 
“natural” humanness ought to be.
Even considering the technological advances of today’s 
world, this argument would follow that the society of our 
children, grandchildren, or other distant descendants would 
consider the practices that are “unnatural” to us at this 
moment are “natural” given their beneficial impact on daily 
life. A simple anecdotal example here would be the rapid 
adaptation to social media platforms for communication, 
spurred by the “smart” cell phone revolution earlier this 
century, and its impacts on various individuals and nations’ 
perception of what “privacy” is as a subject for legislative 
protections. Such examples display the way human society 
has been able to develop and advance for aeons as our tech-
nological revolutions have ebbed and flowed from one major 
advance to the next.
2.1  Considerations for political‑ideology‑specific 
differences in legal protections
What should not be neglected from this argument is that the 
norms of tomorrow are effectually the self-same socio-polit-
ical issues that humanity has been so cautious in address-
ing today. In effect, there can be no progress without some 
forum to consider how a given mindset, practice, technique, 
technology, tool, or other such social construct results in a 
society that is better than it would be without its presence. 
And until our species no longer possesses entities within it 
that could be logically delineated on the basis of their beliefs 
and practices, such as those who would refuse interaction 
with electrical computers or refuse to pilot automobiles, 
we have an obligation to distinguish what protections these 
individuals have when compared to the rest of modern or 
advancing society from a traditional politically-liberalist 
perspective. Similar arguments can be made from politi-
cally-communist or -socialist perspectives as well but are 
ultimately better embedded within the frameworks that have 
established these political theories given their community or 
societal emphases.
To continue upon the benefits of such discourse in liber-
tarian political theories, it is because these individuals who 
refuse to interact with computational technology represent 
something that could innately be considered a “natural” 
way of being or living that a libertarian advocate is obli-
gated to engage in such conversations. More simply put, 
these populations represent some aspect of personal liberties 
that requires sufficiently-considered protections to ensure 
that their ability to establish an autonomous “self” is pre-
served in the face of evolved notions of liberties held by 
those willing to accept these artefacts. The preservation of 
these lifestyles holds more significance than the preservation 
of cultural or religious identities—they serve as an active 
reminder that a less-advanced form of living is in no way 
inferior to the human species as a representation of “good” 
living. To begin with, all technology really gains us is a way 
11 Given its emphasis on the ethics within the art and practice of 
medicine, as opposed to life in a broader sense.
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to make our lives more “convenient” in a long-term outlook 
on life, whether that be through life extension or in making 
mundane tasks automated or enhanced in some fashion. Of 
course, more politically-communist or -socialist perspectives 
may view this argument in a different—albeit, similar—light 
utilising the arguments already given.
What standards should judiciaries and legislative bodies 
base any potential notions for the “natural” human subject 
when developing precedence or policy that would deline-
ate this group of humans from the rest of society in this 
circumstance? Positing that human society will—at some 
near point of time—be required to consider that the rights 
or protections given to a “natural” human are distinctly dif-
ferent than they would be for a “non-natural” human [22, 
23],12 such standards are essential to expound and ruminate 
upon. It cannot be rational for humanity in this day-and-age 
to continuously view the life that holds less convenience to 
be less in need of protections than a life with more conveni-
ence—though this model remains the norm depending on 
the part of the world one looks [17].
Conversely, there will be many advantages to integrat-
ing computational technologies into our biological forms 
beyond merely enhancing our intellectual capacities. These 
include remote interfacing with external technological arte-
facts, improved health monitoring and personalised medical 
care, and a myriad of other such “positive” suggestions. Of 
course, these advances bring with them a need to increase 
individual data security and explore the limits of one’s “right 
to be forgotten” in digital and physical spaces—which is 
arguably a topic of great scrutiny in the AI community 
nowadays, alongside notions of AI “trustworthiness” and 
operational “explainability” that are difficult to define in 
legislative policy parlance across national jurisdictions. 
The most significant barrier for individuals seeking greater 
protections or the “rights” they “deserve” in a politically-
libertarian sense is, as a matter of course, inherently the sys-
tem of governance that retains them; regardless of whether 
this retention is accepted or desired by the individual. The 
barriers present in politically-communist or -socialist soci-
eties are far too numerous to succinctly list here, though 
could be said to stem from the “limits” to which a society 
will go to ensure individual “freedoms” in light of the rela-
tive “good” or “health” of social-based political structures 
at the very least.
Given these arguments, there then develops the complica-
tion that a determination needs to be made regarding whether 
the notion of national autonomy is valid enough to prevent 
certain portions of the human race from receiving an equi-
table inclusion and treatment in the definitional standards of 
“natural” humanness given that such standards should exist 
consistently on an international level. After all, the presence 
of certain societies can be claimed to be extensions of what 
a “natural” human is and would, therefore, be nigh impos-
sible to refute as being “oppressive” or “negligent” from an 
outside perspective. This disparity is most keenly expressed 
by American views on socialist and communist political 
traditions as they have existed since the Cold War period, 
regardless of how anti-democratic these traditions really 
are in practice today nearly thirty years past such politically 
tense times. And yet, it should not be forgotten that several 
charters originating within the United Nations have yet to be 
ratified by the USA—even though that organisation exists, 
in no small part, as a result of that nation’s efforts to address 
the protections that should be given to every human entity 
regardless of whether they are not determined to be as such 
by select individuals or organisations.
Complications with the American legislative system spe-
cific to United Nations charter ratification aside, such ten-
sions within libertarian-preserving societies like the USA 
displays the relative lack of international consensus our 
ever-expanding globalised society is able to reach on such 
topics. Like considerations will need to be made in politi-
cally-social or communal societies, though the emphasis to 
place in this respect is upon how far notions of a “greater 
good” ought to be stretched to maintain some semblance of 
democratic practices as mentioned before. It can hardly be 
a positive motion to transition into a totalitarian state from 
a relatively democratic one for the sake of protecting the 
“right” of humans to maintain some form of “naturalness” in 
their lifestyles—especially once ACIS gain in sophistication 
beyond what these societies have commonly seen to date.
2.2  Teasing out notions of “enhancement” 
from “naturalness”
In truth, it is presumptuous for this author to provide a spe-
cific definition for what constitutes a “natural” human from 
one that is technologically enhanced. Even if one can be 
provided, the example below attempts to display, it still does 
nothing to address the uniqueness of ACIS from other tech-
nological artefacts or the various prostheses humans utilise 
to “normalise” their relatively “impaired” biological func-
tionalities. For example:
A natural human is an entity not only classified as 
Homo sapiens by traditional taxonomy, but a being 
in possession of naturally manipulated genetic mate-
rial that is as indistinguishable from a member of the 
human race as all other members of that race and other 
characteristics that are unique to the species—such as 
the ability to develop systems of language (both oral 
and written), notions of individual will or personal-
ity, and the development and use of tools to improve 
12 Forthcoming work by author under typesetting.
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daily life—insofar as they do not require computerised 
means of manipulation to function.
Some, if any, in the academic community may agree with 
this fairly succinct “definition” for what ought to constitute 
a human as being “natural.” However, many use-cases arise 
wherein this definition may be challenged.
Take the case of a patient requiring a pacemaker—a 
device that may use a wide range of “computerised” parts 
per its relative sophistication—as opposed to a patient 
requiring sight-correcting lenses. To clarify, these lenses 
may also make use of a wide range of “computerised” 
means to provide greater correctional “clarity,” decrease 
refractional glare from light sources, adjust colour to the 
user’s environment (such as those that provide shading out-
of-doors), or decrease eye strain when reading printed text 
or working with computer systems. While these prosthetics 
may not be viewed as being ABPs in the same way that a 
bionic limb or neuroprosthetic may be due to their relative 
lack of ACIS usage, they nevertheless rely upon computer-
ised manipulation somewhere in their development to func-
tion as required. What has changed from these items being 
considered “enhancements” to being “normal” parts of a 
human entity is simply how they allow “impaired” individu-
als to interact with “unimpaired” individuals in a way that 
allows them to contribute to society for good or ill and their 
general presence within various societies [17].
Similarly, the qualification that one’s genetic material 
be naturally manipulated runs into complications when 
GeMa and GT enter into the fold. A patient who has their 
CD34+ hematopoietic stem and progenitor cells undergo 
myeloablation13 to combat the detrimental effects of sickle 
cell anaemia or β-thalassemia and sees a change from 
“impaired” bone marrow to “healthy” forms [13, 40] will 
not be viewed in the same way as an embryoblast that has 
its alleles screened by ACIS or manipulated for “preferred” 
traits [12, 28, 32, 35]. Similarly, there is not a simple way 
to categorise a retinal implant from allele or gene-sequence 
selection in GeMa and GT for (relatively) non-impaired 
sight, given that one’s “natural” genetic makeup is being 
interfered with at some level. While some may question 
this relationship, it must further be stated that inherent and 
individual-specific biochemical factors add justification to 
this claim. Where it may be possible to assume that genetic 
manipulation within an embryoblast does not cause long-
standing detriments in this sense, the medicinal regimes 
a patient must undergo to prevent an organ from being 
“rejected” by their body displays that a “matured” human 
vessel can be interfered with when foreign genetic material 
is detected—albeit, not on the level of an embryoblast under-
going GeMa as such reactions are presently understood.
2.2.1  Specific considerations for GeMa and GT
What makes the retinal implant “normal” and GeMa or GT 
“abnormal,” at least in this author’s opinion, is simply the 
notion that fluid, organ, and tissue donations are culturally 
“appropriate” means whereby living or deceased members 
of the population can help to provide some measure of medi-
cal benefit to patients in need of these items. These notions 
may further be construed as “appropriate” because they are 
assumed to be donated with consent—whereas embryoblasts 
display the potential for new life (or rather, a unique individ-
ual able to make determinations about their body) and can-
not provide such consent, as they lack the cognitive capacity 
to make such decisions. To be clear, these are but anecdotal 
observations that are detached from the larger academic con-
versation taking place on the use of embryoblasts in medical 
research as opposed to donated organs and tissues—among 
other related topics [6, 9, 12, 28, 35, 36]—and only present 
a small level of the bioethical complications of “natural” 
human definitions in this sphere.
Furthermore, the distinction between “natural” humans 
and those who undergo GT or are otherwise influenced by 
GeMa is complex to claim definitively. Outside of a lack 
of external indicator as to a patient’s “naturalness,”14 only 
hospital records or corporate records tracking embryoblas-
tic or pluriblastic laboratory growth could currently dis-
tinguish between the two groups of (technically) “natural” 
humans—at least, insofar as one is considering DNA to be 
a (technically) “natural” component to the human makeup. 
Attempting to force GT patients or children born from GeMa 
practices to prove their lack of “natural” origin would be 
akin to legal discrimination in politically-libertarian socie-
ties—if not in every other society on Earth—much as seg-
regation by skin colour or ethnicity has been viewed as an 
inherently discriminatory practice in the greater part of civil 
society. Without some change in political philosophy in any 
given society, we can rest assured that segregation on the 
scale seen in Gattaca [32] is impractical—if not considered 
wholly immoral—for the foreseeable future. Whether that 
reality holds true for politically-social- or -community-based 
societies is a different matter, however, as their political 
13 Defined as “the administration of total body irradiation and/or 
alkylating agents, at doses which will not allow autologous hema-
tologic recovery” [2] or more simply as a severe form of decreased 
bone marrow activity.
14 Specifically, whether the patient’s prosthesis or genetically manip-
ulated trait(s) is (or are) visible to other members of the population 
and identify them as being “enhanced.” And for clarity, this “visibil-
ity” does not have to be restricted to what one may be able to perceive 
when walking down an avenue—much like tattoos may alter a per-
son’s appearance but can be placed on virtually any area of the human 
body.
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considerations may differ to certain degrees from politically-
libertarian ones. After all, there is little preventing society 
from creating a Gattaca-like world if enough pressure is 
presented from large corporations or national populations 
given the nature of policymaking in democratic societies or 
like examples of such processes from the USA.
To this end, it would be inadvisable to consider GeMa 
patients to be “technologically” enhanced, even if they may 
technically be classified as having undergone HA, to the 
degree that they are regulated in a manner inconsistent with 
other “natural” humans. That is not to say that regulations 
should not exist for the limitations of GT or GeMa practices, 
given the potential for species-wide harm a “perfectionis-
tic” pursuit into genetic editing may cause. Rather, that the 
fact someone has undergone GeMa procedures should be 
akin to them owning a smartphone or other like device that 
enhances them beyond their genetically programmed “norm” 
insofar as the GeMa or GT in question is performed to pre-
vent potentially deadly diseases or in vitro genetic material 
recombination that is not adjusting factors that may oth-
erwise be legally protected.15 These arguments extend to 
the acquisition of organs not developed by oneself (insofar 
as they are not bionic), GT that is used to cure an activ-
ity-hindering genetic disorder like sickle cell anaemia or 
β-thalassemia [13], and related biotechnological treatments 
that ultimately only present a difference in genetic material.
That is not to say that there is no merit in later deter-
mining an effective, non-invasive manner that society can 
utilise to determine who was born utilising GT or GeMa 
techniques to then classify these populations as technologi-
cally enhanced in a higher degree. Emphasis should be reit-
erated on the author’s use of “current,” as opposed to other 
language that may indicate a more permanent framing of 
the issue, however. Much as intersexuality is not currently 
viewed to be a legally-binding gender that needs to appear 
on birth certificates or population census reports (in the 
USA, at the very least),16 the extent to which one’s innate 
genetic code has been technologically manipulated needs 
to first become an issue of social consideration of politi-
cal importance—at least, in politically-libertarian societies. 
Viewed from the perspective of granting basic protections to 
these populations, if not more unique ones as well, society 
can then determine at-large ways in which the categorisation 
of these groups can be handled in a non-discriminatory or 
non-exclusive manner. Similar approaches would be pru-
dent for the incorporation of those populations that possess 
a greater level of technological augmentation, or for ACIS 
systems that are indistinguishable from humans.
3  On moral obligations to “natural” 
and “unnatural” humans
To preface this section, it should be mentioned that a bioeth-
ical take to moral obligation is being addressed herein above 
other available frameworks because the author views medi-
cal technology—both external and implanted devices—to be 
the area of jurisprudence where academics, legal scholars, 
policymakers, and other stakeholders will find the greatest 
range of lacunae. Where there will certainly be other areas 
where ACIS poses significant challenges to governance bod-
ies internationally, they do not challenge notions of legal 
personality to the degree that ABPs, exoskeletons, internal 
homeostasis-regulating devices, and other like medicine-
specific artefacts have the potential to display—especially 
when arguments for the “right” of relatively “unimpaired” 
patients to attain such devices becomes more pronounced.
Particularly, in biomedical ethics, there exist a myriad of 
theories to aid one in determining “moral status” for popu-
lations that may not be able to express their intent to physi-
cians, medical engineers, or other like members of the medi-
cal community. One such commonly recognised method is 
presented by Beauchamp and Childress [5], pp. 65–98). As 
they argue:
The terms status and standing have been transported 
to ethics from the notion of legal standing. In a weak 
sense, “moral status” refers to a position, grade, or 
rank of moral importance. In a strong sense, “moral 
status” means to have rights or the functional equiv-
alent of rights. Any being has moral status if moral 
agents have moral obligations to it, the being [in ques-
tion] has welfare interests, and the moral obligations 
owed to it are based on its [perceived welfare] inter-
ests…To have moral status is to deserve at least some 
of the protections afforded by moral norms, including 
[various] principles, rules, obligations, and rights…
15 Explicitly, the factors the author advocates to protect are those 
such as skin colour and sex or gender (outside of disorders not related 
to intersex conditions). Others may exist—such as ethnicity when tied 
to paternal or maternal ethnic origin, or notions of gender-specific 
hereditary familiar “honour” and other like gender-specific hereditary 
notions—but are not explicitly defined to intentionally induce a factor 
of ambiguity to such classifications.
16 Which may furthermore be exacerbated by “gender correcting” 
procedures conducted on children in their youth regardless of the 
overall health of “abnormal” sexual organs or “malformed” geni-
talia. See the Columbia Center for Clinical Medical Ethics’ recent 
discussion with Katrina Karkazis (2021, last accessed 5 February 
2021, https:// www. youtu be. com/ watch?v= ZXIxA 9G2Th Y& featu re= 
youtu. be) for more details on why gender has not been mentioned as 
an aspect of “normal” humanity thus far, and as an example of how 
ACIS allele selection may do more harm than good specific to sex 
selection in embryoblasts.
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These protections are afforded only to entities that can 
be morally wronged by actions [5], pp. 65, 67, empha-
sis added).
Furthermore, they argue that only “direct” moral objects 
can “…count in their own right, are morally more than mere 
means to the production of benefits for others, and have 
basic interests, whereas indirect moral objects do not” ([5], 
p. 67). In other words, only “direct” moral objects can be 
considered morally significant enough entities to attribute 
moral status to. Such notions are not specific to the field 
of bioethics, and likely adds confusion to those attempting 
to understand their importance in legal discourses and vice 
versa.
As for why this argument is pertinent to our current dis-
cussion, particularly when incorporating ACIS that are being 
modelled after human intelligence and its integration into 
the human subject vis-à-vis HA techniques into the broader 
argument, is that Beauchamp and Childress [5] consider 
computers to be entities only deserving to be classified as 
“indirect” moral objects (p. 67). While this sentiment may be 
apparent throughout the entirety of biomedical ethics-based 
discourse,17 it naturally disregards any and all notions that 
ACIS are being modelled to replicate the actions, knowl-
edge, and rationalities of human—or “directly” moral—sub-
jects [27, 31]. To be fair, these authors do discuss the ques-
tionable nature of human foetuses developing in (virtually) 
“dead” mothers-to-be contrary to any wishes she may have 
held before death, and the ethically ambiguous (or conten-
tious) nature of the treatment of human-animal hybrids—
mainly when dealing with human brain cells ([5], pp. 66, 
69–71). How they address these subjects, though, does not 
excuse their lack of treatment regarding the “human” nature 
of ACIS.
Even if one were to concede that only select instantiations 
of ACIS could rationally be categorised as holding the quali-
ties argued to be essential for moral status by Beauchamp 
and Childress,18 we must still consider the implications of 
how the union between ACIS and human consciousness 
will challenge the notions of “human” identity, liability, 
and labour-centred “worth” [21–23].19 Of course, this argu-
ment does not mean to claim that all ACIS-human mergers 
will necessarily change some fundamental phenomenologi-
cal aspect of reality—merely that the introduction of such 
mergers with self-learning ACIS specifically will introduce 
this uncertainty regarding our interpretation of our environs, 
if not with select dormant or static ACIS ([23], p. 2).
A simple example of this would be to compare a com-
mon pacemaker today to one that can be externally manipu-
lated by a self-learning system that may be able to improve 
overall blood “quality” (e.g., pulse, heart rate, erythrocyte 
and leukocyte count) in a remote fashion to allow one to 
become (effectively) better at performing certain physical 
activities. The former is seen as a life-sustaining measure 
in lieu of a heart transplant, whereas the latter would sig-
nificantly transform our notions of what ought to qualify 
one as a professional athlete, commercial model, or another 
such occupation where blood “quality” regulation would be 
seen as a benefit (including manual labour). While the ACIS 
itself may not be sophisticated enough or have been provided 
enough storage space to create the potential for a unique 
“will” to arise from the system, this may not be the case 
for larger computer systems or bionic structures. As such, a 
re-evaluation seems necessary to reclassify select instantia-
tions of ACIS in such a way as they will be considered to 
have “moral obligations” and “welfare interests” insofar as 
to allow for moral obligations to these systems to be “…
based on its [perceived welfare] interests” ([5], p. 65).
To turn back to Beauchamp and Childress’ point regard-
ing the nature of moral statuses and their philosophically 
significant attributions, it should be stated that technology 
management to the degree sought by this author is some-
thing that is mostly ignored within the text cited—if not 
in the majority of biomedically-significant ethical works.20 
The treatment of topics such as eugenics and GeMa are 
only lightly addressed in works focussed on “fundamental” 
biomedically-based ethical concerns and arguably have not 
advanced significantly since the initiation of the Human 
Genome Project at the turn of the millennium [5, 14, 43]. 
Naturally, this opens a legal lacuna as to the treatment of 
developing medical technologies and their impact on “funda-
mental” bioethical principles and theories of treatment [23].
None of this dearth of academic attention in “fundamen-
tal” works helps the budding bioethicist or physician to 
understand the complexities of integrating technology into 
the human form outside of how their research is impacted 
by Internal Review Boards, professional codes of ethics or 
standards, or other regulatory procedures that exist at local 
or national levels. And in tangent, it does not aid one in 
an engineering or technology-based field in understanding 
where a lack of understanding may exist between a medical 
researcher and device manufacturer. As such, it may be no 
fault of modern bioethical discourse to fail to address these 17 Which these authors could feasibly be stated as having significant 
influence over given how widely their work is used within the field as 
reference and study material.
18 Specifically, those with advanced self-learning architectures that 
either mimic or go beyond the capability of commonly understood 
notions of human logic.
19 Forthcoming work by author under typesetting.
20 These include related works like Case Studies in Biomedical Eth-
ics: Decision-Making, Principles, and Cases, 2nd ed. by Veatch et al. 
[43].
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subjects if they are relying only upon works such as those 
developed by Beauchamp and Childress or founded upon 
those principles; nor why those emphasising in technological 
development may view bioethical scrutiny to be misguided 
or misinformed.
With these topics having been observed in this fash-
ion, it may be a non-starter to seek biomedical ethics to be 
the platform upon which advocacy for “unnatural” human 
protection(s) can be cemented upon—thus forcing us to turn 
to some other field of ethical or legal inquiry that would 
serve as a better foundation for these arguments. As shown, 
there is an overall lack of consideration by these scholars in 
regard to ACIS or machine learning systems in general—
beyond the general dearth of intersection between bioethi-
cists and AI-focussed scholars, engineering ethicists, or 
technoethicists in this realm of consideration. Otherwise, 
society would likely be faced with a similar Ethical, Legal 
and Social Implications Research Programme as was held 
for the Human Genome Project at the turn of the millen-
nium given the severity of the subjects such a Programme 
would be addressing. Who ought to champion such an effort, 
however, may yet be something that cannot be sufficiently 
addressed until some external governing body requires col-
laboration of this kind. Rushing to name a specific entity or 
group of specialists would be rash given the potential topics 
such an organisation or group may inherently consider to be 
of “little consequence” or “too abstract to pertain to today’s 
technologies.”
4  Blurred lines in humanity‑CI chimaeras
Too often, the term “transhuman” appears in academic lit-
erature as a source of “hype” to attract attention to a given 
work. Though several definitions exist to cover the entire 
scope of the transhumanist movement, it can broadly be seen 
as:
[a] social and philosophical movement devoted to pro-
moting the research and development of robust human-
enhancement technologies. Such technologies would 
augment or increase human sensory reception, emo-
tive ability, or cognitive capacity as well as radically 
improve human health and extend human life spans. 
Such modifications resulting from the addition of bio-
logical or physical technologies would be more or less 
permanent and integrated into the human body [18].
The concept of transhumanism, much as Amanda du 
Preez argues, ignores the concept that humans are what this 
author considers to be “perfectly flawed” entities. In her 
introduction, she makes the following observations:
The body is crudely perceived as a bad invention that 
needs to be redesigned and re-engineered. In the view 
of these “no-body” theorists, the redundancy of the 
physical body is a conclusive fact. All that remains 
to be done is to finalise the details of complete body 
depletion and replacement. Broadly speaking there 
are two general trends within the “no-body” techno-
enlightenment project: the first attempts to remake the 
body, while the other aims to amputate the body in 
its entirety. The first project sets out to enhance and 
augment the body technologically by replacing body 
parts and re-engineering the body. The other aims con-
sciously at full-scale transcendence, leaving the body 
behind and becoming cyber-consciousness (mind) 
only. If a body is still required at all, it will be a virtual 
body that can swim the ether … The proposition that 
we can indeed, become bodiless, in other words, make 
progress, go forward without being embodied beings 
that actually constitute physical bodies, already sug-
gest a critical disparity or unbridgeable chasm between 
physicality and meta-physics. The proposition assumes 
that there is a state that can be aspired towards, where 
visceral functions and pains can be eliminated on the 
way towards incorporeal virtual consciousness. It is 
the task of this book to subvert such notions, by show-
ing that there is no existence possible without embodi-
ment of some sort ([11], pp. xv–xvi).
To exceed our limitations through technological means is 
not to shed our sense of identity completely, else there would 
be no delineation between the self and one’s environs. To 
attain such an existence, in the eyes of the transhumanist, 
would be contrary to their goals insofar as they seek to retain 
some semblance of a “self” identity that can be distinguished 
from other entities. Hence, some aspect of the embodied 
experience is required to maintain a sense of self [9, 33]—
at least, insofar as a process-of-elimination approach may 
determine in this scenario. Let us examine the notion of 
embodiment as a necessary aspect of self-identity from a 
different perspective to give further credence to this point:
Suppose technology leads humanity to the point where 
one’s consciousness, personality, or soul (whichever 
term envelops the entirety of the human experience to 
the reader) can be replicated onto a digital format at 
the expense of discarding one’s natural form. For any 
who take advantage of this new capability in technol-
ogy, we will posit that one is not limited to their sin-
gular gender-constricted experience; rather, that they 
have the freedom to experience life in as many differ-
ent digital forms as their digital memory will allow. 
Under such conditions, the first generation of uploaded 
consciousnesses realises that they do not “feel” emo-
tion in the way they were once able to. Instead, there is 
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a lack of splanchnic or visceral input that would denote 
which emotion is to be felt in a given instance. As 
such, these digitised humans must rely upon their prior 
experiences with a biology-based emotional “feeling” 
to determine what emotion fits to which situation. Sup-
pose that the ability to procreate is also not limited 
within this scenario and that offspring are produced 
in a manner that enables them to possess the same 
“blank slate” a biological child has—meaning that the 
child will be able to develop its own unique personal-
ity without reliance upon the memories of its parents. 
As a child grows, the parents come to realise that its 
personality differs from their expectations. Rather than 
expressing an unhindered range of emotions, as they 
do, it seems to think before settling on an emotion in 
reaction to their own ([23], p. 12, emphasis added).
If a scenario such as the one provided above is unde-
sirable on account of an inability to grant one’s “progeny” 
the ability to enjoy the full range of human expression one 
would wish any regular child to possess, then steps must be 
taken in a judicial and policy-development sense that would 
prevent this tragedy. Of course, the author does not suggest 
that it is only libertarian-based societies that are incentivised 
to develop regulation to this extent. Social- and commu-
nity-based societies have an obligation, as per the notion 
of public interest, to contemplate the extremes they would 
find “acceptable” to pine for and develop within their own 
realms of influence and protect against extremes they find to 
be against their collective interest. Whether this is feasible in 
a world where libertarian-based societies may not place as 
stringent a regulation on the development of technologies as 
a social- or community-based one is a separate matter—one 
that is continuously being played out on the world stage on 
a day-to-day basis.
In the context of ACIS, it would serve to remind the 
reader of the initial form these entities exist in—being, of 
course, in the digital realm. As this author states in his inau-
gural piece:
AGI [artificial general intelligence] and other NBI 
[non-biological intelligence] systems are not limited 
to what we consider “robots.” This concept is vital to 
understanding what rights AGI and other NBI systems 
should possess, as well as the responsibilities they 
hold. What is regarded as a body to an AGI is differ-
ent to what the average human mind portrays [e.g., an 
anthropomorphic mechanised entity.]. It can either be 
a single computer, the whole of the Internet, or another 
such sophisticated computer network, beyond possess-
ing an anthropomorphic or quadriplegic form ([21], 
p. 344).
Coupled with the other example provided by the author, 
it would be prudent for the reader to understand the dangers 
of anthropomorphising ACIS in such a way that it is viewed 
as merely being an extension of humanity as opposed to a 
non-biological agent that has access to vast troves of data. 
To be blunt, ACIS is alien to us and therefore cannot be said 
to be “understood” by humanity via the conventions we have 
come to learn about its existence on Earth to date. While 
there are certainly dangers that exist with the utilisation of 
“static” ACIS, they pale in comparison to a self-learning 
system that may be able to extrapolate knowledge in a more 
conventional sense—arguably being the pairing of informa-
tion or data with some unique (or rather, biased) meaning.21
4.1  Further “types” of humans
With the distinction of “natural” human already discussed, 
we must now consider the other manners in which one may 
be considered human but not necessarily a computerised 
intelligence. Not only will this effort serve to further explore 
the different potential subgroups of humanity and distinguish 
the differences in protections they may require, but it will 
provide further justification to develop a sufficiently broad 
understanding of the legal personality of computer-based 
intelligence systems and protections for these systems in 
human–computer and computer-computer interactions [23]. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this work, these “types” 
of humans should necessarily be defined by the extent to 
which their “natural” selves have been augmented—whether 
willingly or not, as would be the case of GeMa in germline 
editing techniques.
The ultimate basis for a refusal to modify one’s form, 
realistically, should not rely upon secular or spiritual argu-
ments; nor should they be dependent upon some notion of 
individual bodily ownership—contrary to what other schol-
ars have drafted on the subject [35, 36]. Instead, refusal 
should be based upon the responsibility thrust upon those 
who willingly modify themselves. By responsibility, it is 
not to be interpreted as the “right to rule” or the “right to 
determine for others.”
Rather, it should be interpreted as the responsibility of 
those who are technologically enhanced to not infringe upon 
the privacy or autonomy of others. In essence, it should be 
based upon an increasingly stringent protocol of “do no 
harm” as one approaches the realm of ACIS, which means 
that individual modification comes with the risk of being 
held liable above and beyond those with lesser modifications 
21 The use of “bias” here refers to the thoughts and beliefs that are 
unique to each human subject, though further discussion on this topic 
requires a thorough examination into phenomenological, epistemo-
logical, or metaphysical arguments on the subject. As such, they will 
not be expanded upon further herein.
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in cases of property damage and like civil or federal suits—
and that this liability carries more considerable penalties 
the more one gains in augmentation. This suggestion serves 
two purposes: the first to address the concern of equity in 
attaining augmentations, and the second to ensure that the 
concept of noblesse oblige does not become synonymous 
with HA. Although this may not seem “fair” considering the 
expense of technological enhancements, it must be stated 
that the ability to augment oneself ought to be a privilege, 
not a right; much like with the ownership of other techno-
logical artefacts. This statement is made in consideration for 
the preservation of the “natural” human race and other such 
notions as mentioned herein.
That is not to say that these rules should immediately 
be implemented. As mentioned before, patient populations 
already exist that rely upon ABPs—albeit, oftentimes not 
bionic in nature—and a failure to distinguish between the 
semantic distinctions between the types of computational 
intelligence present within each device (if present at all) will 
ultimately result in unjust legislative action. And for those 
ABPs that do not immediately make use of ACIS (such as 
certain GeMa or GT treatments, organ transplants or print-
ing, or optical lens construction for glasses and contacts), 
reviews will necessarily need to be made as to whether lia-
bility and culpability should remain as-is under new legal 
paradigms—outside of whether such non-ACIS-dependent 
prosthetics or techniques should receive preferential treat-
ment as clinical tools for patients, given the lack of expense 
they incur to be manufactured or performed compared with 
their ACIS-dependent counterparts in a world where ACIS 
development is highly expensive. These expenses are not 
just to the hardware and code development of the system; 
but apply to the attainment of training data and potential 
interoperability with other systems and other like processes.
This delineation goes beyond the broad categorisations 
for computational intelligence systems that pervade aca-
demia and industry—which may broadly be sorted by func-
tion as reactive machine, limited memory, theory of mind, 
and self-aware systems [26], for example. Arguably, each of 
these broader categories holds a range of existing or antici-
pated systems that can be further classified by the training 
data they receive, the function of the algorithm driving the 
system, and many other criterium. Major struggles for regu-
lators will be to ensure that the system in question is accu-
rately represented within the various subcategorizations it 
may be subjected to and the extent to which these systems 
can be considered proprietary when utilising open-source 
code, among others. Naturally, such considerations must 
include how to handle malicious or seemingly-malicious 
data subject manipulation or coercion [22].22
One manner in which enhancement-based classifica-
tion may be created is through the deployment of “groups” 
of individuals who could feasibly be held within these 
restraints. This approach would be favourable in scenarios 
wherein the delineation of various technologically enhanced 
groups is generally understood or practised.
The manipulation of the human germline with bio-
technology raises concerns as to whether the result-
ing embryo can still be classified as a member of the 
same species as its parents, should unrestricted genetic 
manipulation be permitted on legal and moral grounds 
for more than life-saving interventions. In contrast, the 
manipulation of somatic cells is steadily being consid-
ered an ethically permissible medicinal therapy to cir-
cumvent potentially dangerous illnesses in one’s post-
partum life. Yet in both cases, the patient in question 
is subjecting their genome to “unnatural” changes—
which some would call a technology-aided artificial 
selection practice or directed evolution—and as such 
are no longer “natural” humans if we consider this sta-
tus to be tied to our genetic makeup. The commonly 
held concern is whether our notion of “humanness” 
is enough to incorporate these patients as part of the 
species at large, and whether individuals have a right to 
an unaltered genome. Depending upon the definition of 
who constitutes as a member of human society, there is 
concern that patients with manipulated genetics would 
not fit under a “genetically-natural” definition if it is 
proposed. For this purpose, it may be best to separate 
the human population into distinct categories, such as 
biologically-natural, genetically-manipulated, com-
puter-aided, and cybernetically-enhanced (TABHI), 
among others. The line that would be most ambigu-
ous would be the cybernetically-enhanced human cat-
egory, which would need to have specific definitions 
in place to separate the “humans” from the [“computer 
intelligence system(s)”] and cyborg-specific intelli-
gences ([22], p. 12).23
Another such proposal would be through the utilisation 
of a definitional spectrum (Fig. 1), which allows for greater 
fluidity or in circumstances where delineations are signifi-
cantly vaguer. Where both systems have their merits, the 
author is divided upon which would be the best to propose 
for widespread utilisation. After all, each society may wish 
to adopt aspects of both systems; or find one system to be 
more fitting for statutes up for public consideration. As with 
understandings for what ought to qualify as “natural human-
ness,” the onus will have to fall upon governance bodies 
and organisations to determine not only which approach best 
22 Forthcoming work by author under typesetting. 23 Forthcoming work by author under typesetting.
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suits the needs of their members—but how such adoptions 
can easily translate across cultural boundaries. An example 
of a definitional spectrum is given here, though it should not 
be considered the end-all-be-all of such spectrums.
At the “low” end of the definitional spectrum, it may be 
argued that humans that utilise “normal” forms of enhance-
ment and GeMa patients be placed into a split category 
explicitly defined by the lack of non-biological or compu-
tational enhancements24 present within or upon their form. 
Although this may not be the “easiest” way to distinguish a 
less-enhanced human from a relatively unenhanced human, 
it at least establishes the notion that the presence of non-bio-
logical or computational material within or upon the human 
form serves as the baseline for a visual representation of 
“enhanced” human groups. This author would further advo-
cate for a right or social agreement that all humans retain the 
ability to remain technologically unmanipulated concern-
ing genetic material [6, 35, 36], as well as maintaining the 
ability to self-regulate one’s neurological or psychological 
state insofar as it does not cause harm to other members of 
society [39]. Of course, this extends to the ability to refuse 
technological integration into one’s form [6, 35, 36].
The second “stage” of the definitional spectrum may 
reasonably constitute individuals with minor technological 
augmentations (such as patients with pacemakers without 
self-learning ACIS) and incorporate all related technologies 
non-reliant upon self-learning ACIS that do not directly or 
indirectly enhance human intelligence. This aspect of the 
spectrum would extend to the utilisation of virtual avatars, 
though not the linking between these avatars and the human 
consciousness as envisioned by transhumanists. The ration-
ale for this range of technologies to be presented as such 
is due to the lack of tangible devices that can currently be 
integrated within and upon the human form that require 
self-learning ACIS and the range of self-learning architec-
tures that currently exist within “smart” code. As such, it 
is not currently clear as to which form these self-learning 
devices will take or their individual range of capabilities; 
and a lack of evidence for programme code that adapts at 
or beyond human-like levels prevents a firm example for 
what architectures ought not to be considered as belonging 
in a higher category. Although some research is being con-
ducted into the impacts of “smart” code in bionic prosthet-
ics (specifically ABPs for hands) and ways in which tactile 
interactions can be improved [1, 44], technological advances 
with the sole purpose of interacting with virtual CIS and 
avatars may have less obvious implications for their effect 
on society. These include devices such as the Oculus Rift or 
fictional devices seen as the “ideal” for developing a full-
dive virtual reality.
A potential tertiary gradient would include those tech-
nologies that influence any aspect of human intelligence in a 
manner currently not seen through the utilisation of nootrop-
ics, though some separate consideration may be given to the 
type of nootropic being utilised and its overall impacts on 
cognitive functionality. Given that our current best under-
standing of human consciousness and “selfhood” reside 
within the confines of the human brain, the technological 
augmentation of this organ should hold the most signifi-
cant legal responsibilities and consequences. This rationale 
becomes especially pressing when considering that the aug-
mentation of the brain may lead to detrimental emotional 
impacts on the patient ([21], pp. 344–345, [23]). There is, 
however, a clear line that needs to be drawn between those 
possessing behaviour-regulating augmentations to prevent 
certain neurological disorders from interfering from daily 
activities and those who augment themselves for more “rec-
reational” rationales. In this sense, patients in the former 
category would fall under the second proposed gradient 
given the need for these devices to enhance one’s ability to 
contribute to society as opposed to merely requesting aug-
mentation to improve cognitive performance through direct 
integration of self-learning ACIS to the human brain.
Autonomous
ACISGradient of Humanity “Type” Gradient of ACIS “Type”
Fig. 1  A visualisation of gradients from “natural” human to basic computational intelligence systems
24 Explicitly targeted at explaining the presence or absence of ACIS, 
whether they be biologically- or mechanically-designed. To this end, 
“smart” devices as they are understood at the time of this writing do 
not fall into this category.
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To be clear, what this author can offer regarding prosthe-
ses (particularly neuroprostheses) are recommendations for 
their handling based upon concerns they have regarding their 
potential for abuse and misuse by governing organisations, 
corporations, and nation states. Definitively proclaiming the 
handling of specific patient groups in particular manners is 
best left to governing organisations and nation states that can 
canvas those who will be impacted by the determinations 
the most, and who ultimately generate industry standards 
and laws that regulate their overall protections. While these 
proposals may be effective for a politically-libertarian soci-
ety that favours precautionary regulation, they may evidently 
not be effective in other political traditions and philosophies. 
Ultimately, humanity should remain sceptical and cautious 
to the promise of self-learning ACIS when directly inter-
facing with the human nervous system—whether that be 
the central or peripheral system [22]. Given the propensity 
for computer systems to come under attack by malicious 
software, the threat of a patient becoming hostage to their 
prosthetic ought to be driving government or regulating 
authorities to approach the integration of ACIS into ABPs 
with extreme levels of oversight and regulation rather than 
more lackadaisical approaches that may be taken to devices 
that pose less of a threat to a patient’s health.
Finally, considerations should be developed for the dis-
tinction between what constitutes as a computer-original 
ACIS and an organically-original ACIS—given that our 
technological advancements may lead us to produce ACIS 
that can gain a biologic form, and vice versa [21]. Where this 
is presently in the realm of transhumanist desires and not a 
(presently) attainable reality, there is no tangible manner 
wherein regulations for this extreme of technology could be 
reviewed or developed. The most straightforward parallel 
that could be drawn to this aspect of technological enhance-
ment would be found in Star Trek: The Next Generation—
namely, with the introduction of the Borg as a race [19]. 
Another, less popular, reference could be made to the film 
Expelled from Paradise, where virtualised consciousnesses 
are “grown” human bodies when dispatched to Earth’s sur-
face [30]. While these examples are extreme, there is lit-
tle doubt that the potential for entities of these natures to 
become a reality as technological advances pose a significant 
risk to the notion of human-centred legal personality [23].
4.2  Augmentation vs bionicalization: can “cyborg” 
be empirically defined?
To further elaborate upon the legal complexities that sur-
round ACIS-human mergers in HA, one notion seems to 
remain vaguely defined in academic literature—namely, in 
whether an empirical definition of a “cyborg” can be gener-
ated and maintained for use in legal proceedings. Science-
fiction media may offer up many examples as to individuals 
holding simple augmentations (e.g., exoskeletons, ABPs, 
integrated communication devices) as opposed to being 
“cybernetic” in nature such as the Borg [19]. Yet, these are 
but the examples provided to us by the minds of scriptwrit-
ers and effects teams to convey some purported “difference” 
between augmented and bionicalized human subjects and 
non-augmented beings. One such quandary may present 
itself in asking whether Jake Sully from James Cameron’s 
Avatar [8] is actually a biological entity at all after his trans-
fer from the paraplegic form he embodied. While it may be 
radical to question that logic given the unrealistic nature 
of the technology employed, how would that differ from 
abandoning one’s biological form for a digital one? Both 
examples present an “alien” entity as the secondary form, 
but the individual manipulating said form is first and fore-
most human.
Some may argue that the Avatar example is far-fetched 
considering how the resulting form is still comprised of 
chemically-organic matter—to which, this author argues that 
a similar transference may feasibly occur between human 
subjects and with ACIS as displayed in Mizushima’s work 
[30]. What is vital to remember in this regard is that any 
existence outside of one’s naturally granted form necessar-
ily requires technological artefacts to attain, experience, and 
ultimately retain. In that sense then, all such experiences 
are naturally cybernetic by virtue of how they arise insofar 
as cybernetics is defined in terms of digital communica-
tion between systems. More broadly then, the concept of a 
cybernetic organism may feasibly exist within human society 
today if we consider our “digital” personalities or avatars 
[3]. It is vital to make this distinction on account of how the 
term “cyborg” is presented in legal literature [17], especially 
where semantics are so vitally important in litigation and 
jurisprudence.
While seemingly “radical,” these arguments nevertheless 
aim to “suss out” the intrinsic nature of what distinguishes 
a patient with an ABP that is reliant upon ACIS to function, 
a human whose consciousness has been transferred onto a 
computer system,25 a para- or quadriplegic patient whose 
consciousness is transferred into a robot, and an ACIS. Natu-
rally, this quandary extends to whether an ACIS’ existence 
as a computer system ought to qualify it as an embodied 
existence or a digital one and the legal ramifications for that 
delineation as other digital spaces are legally classified and 
granted protections. Simply protecting intellectual property 
in this environment, as should be shown through these argu-
ments, does not settle this troubling lacuna in legal language 
or field-wide understanding of how subjects actually exist 
in the natural world.
25 And subsequently of a child “born” in that same environment.
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5  Conclusion
Given the distinctions made herein regarding the legal per-
sonality that arguably should be attributed to members of 
humanity based upon the extent to which they incorporate 
electrical computers into their daily lives and individual 
forms, it could be said that judiciaries and policy-devel-
opment bodies now have at least one basis to begin delib-
erations for the definitions they wish to adopt or evolve to 
conform to the nature and shape of their various societies. 
And it should be argued that it is their obligation to urgently 
begin these deliberations insofar as they are not centred 
solely upon the treatment of artificial (computer) intelligence 
systems or the treatment of biotechnological advancements.
Only approaching technological regulation from a vague 
notion of ACIS and the impact they have on commercial and 
private entities is misguided as it does not take into consid-
eration the biological-computer mergers that are currently 
under development for particular technologies [22, 44] in 
the USA and abroad. Therefore, an approach that incorpo-
rates a polythematic (as opposed to a solely interdisciplinary 
or cross-cutting) perspective to these issues is required to 
ensure that individual and societal interests are being fully 
considered. In this manner, it can be assured that a wide 
range of socio-legal and political issues can be addressed 
en masse to ensure that judicial and policy-development 
systems are not “bogged down” by a seemingly-endless 
slew of complications that arise from human–computer and 
computer-computer relationships.
One such project is currently under development by the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers with their 
P7000 series of engineering standards, which is already 
displaying the influence of their Ethically Aligned Design 
[20] initiative to provide one perspective of industry-level AI 
ethics principles and requirements. Generating standards for 
industry alone, however, is not enough to solve more com-
plex questions such as what the limitation of “cybernetic” 
as a term ought to be in academic, industry-encompassing, 
and legal language. Given the current developments being 
taken by AI ethicists (namely in how educationally diverse 
the field is becoming), there is yet hope that some current 
entity will take on the role of developing an Ethical, Legal 
and Social Implications Research Programme centred upon 
the continued advancement of computational intelligence 
and its integration into various devices that humanity will 
inevitably come to rely upon. Barring that, however, such 
an entity must arise through the collaboration of various 
stakeholders—meaning that simply relying upon the clout of 
so-called futurists or a particular vein of scholars would do 
no more than allow current industry-wide trends to remain 
unfettered to wider societal concerns that these groups may 
lack consideration or knowledge to address.
By actively searching for the opinions of traditionally 
neglected populations (e.g., indigenous peoples, the eco-
nomically-disadvantaged, gender queer communities), and 
attempting to rise these populations to a position where they 
can actually engage with those more well-to-do in society 
on a more equal basis, society as a whole can attempt to 
restructure the relationships between its members accord-
ingly. Inevitable transformations to commercial “business-
as-usual” may ease away from a rapid loss of “necessary” 
jobs in the labour market, given that ACIS may rapidly dis-
play a capability that was previously thought to require much 
more time to achieve as in the case of AlphaFold [10, 24, 
29]. Education standards—which arguably are in dire need 
of an update given how may terminal degree holders strug-
gle to find employment in the USA and abroad, and the rela-
tive value of other degrees relative to primary and second-
ary education or K-12 schooling—can likewise be adapted 
to incorporate the reality that is readily available ACIS to 
future labour market contributors. And it may ultimately be 
discovered that the need for 40-or-more hour weeks is sig-
nificantly reduced with the ethically guided introduction of 
ACIS into various spheres,which would inevitably require a 
re-evaluation of material good value, cost of living, and the 
ability of markets to cater to perceived consumer demands 
or niche deficiencies in local or global supply chains.
In tangent to this, legal considerations need to be gen-
erated regarding the ability for ACIS to be held liable 
under current notions of mens rea,26 as well as the extent 
to self-representation in court under the notion of in prope 
persona27 given the potential for CIS to exist outside of 
a singular format ([21], p. 347). Of course, these consid-
erations should extend to the limits in which a court can 
realistically contain a given CIS under a ne exeat repiblica 
order,28 whether the CI can be defined noscitur a sociis,29 
if the ACIS cannot be defended under the notion of cura or 
curator types,30 respondeat superior,31 or res communis32; 
how to approach an in rem case that becomes challenged by 
26 Specifically referring to a “guilty mind” in legal terms.
27 The legal phrase for when one represents themselves in court with-
out the official assistance of an attorney.
28 Referring to a court order to prevent a party from leaving or being 
removed from the jurisdiction of a particular court during legal pro-
ceedings.
29 Or rather, as a concept that is unclassifiable in the whole context in 
which it is used.
30 Specifically referring to legal guardianship under which a ward 
is considered to be totally and permanently incapable from a legal 
stance.
31 More commonly understood as the superior taking legal responsi-
bility for actions performed by their subordinate(s).
32 “Common” property, insofar as that property cannot be subjected 
to individual ownership (like airspace).
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notions of sui juris or non scienter33; whether uti possidetis 
can be determined under notions of commixtio (or the suf-
ficiency of jus tertii)34; or a general inability to determine 
locatio conductio or like notions of servitus for the purposes 
of determining the legality of the “work” conducted by the 
CI system in cases of “legal” work in a nation’s borders. 
While some of these cases may be present in courtrooms 
today, others are likely far from barristers’ minds. As such, 
listing out just a few of these complex deliberations that have 
not been seen in courts to date may help those in the legal 
communicate deliberate on how such cases may be defended 
or prosecuted.
With these potential legal challenges before us (and 
undoubtedly many others), our tendency towards reaction-
ary justice in various legal systems internationally must be 
circumvented. To ignore such deliberations before a compli-
cated case can be submitted before a judicial system is the 
height of legal folly—especially where the interpretation of 
constitutionally-granted rights may be expansive.
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